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et al.: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
N.Y CONST. art. 1, § 6.
In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be

allowed to appearand defend in person and with counsel as in
civil actions ....
U.S. CONST. amend V.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall.., have the
Assistance of Counselfor his defence.

COURT OF APPEALS
13 0 4

People v. Claudio
(decided December 21, 1993)

Defendant claimed that his right to the effective assistance of
counsel, pursuant to the State Constitution, 1305 was violated
when he made inculpatory statements to the District Attorney's

representative upon the advice of his retained attorney.1 306 The
New York Court of Appeals held that defendant's constitutional

right was not violated because "the State is not charged with the
responsibility of guaranteeing effective legal counsel upon the
entry of counsel at the preaccusatory, investigatory stage of the
criminal matter .... "1307

In 1980, defendant was indicted for the homicide of a high
school student. 1308 Upon the advice of his retained counsel,
1304. 83 N.Y.2d 76, 629 N.E.2d 384, 607 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1993).
1305. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This provision states in part: "In any trial in
any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in
person and with counsel as in civil actions... ."Id.
1306. Claudio, 83 N.Y.2d at 78, 629 N.E.2d at 385, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
1307. Id.
1308. Id. at 78, 629 N.E.2d at 384, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 912. On the morning of
May 15, 1980, a sixteen year old high school student was robbed and fatally
shot after she had returned from her prom. People v. Claudio (Claudio 1), 59
N.Y.2d 556, 558, 453 N.E.2d 500, 500, 466 N.Y.S.2d 271, 271 (1983). Four
days later, the police, in response to an anonymous tip, went to the home of
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statements

representative. 1309

The

to

indictment

the

District

was

based

1310

primarily on these statements.
In 1983, the New York Court
of Appeals "affirmed the denial of defendant's motion to

suppress

[these]

defendant's Sixth
not violated. 1313

inculpatory

statements,"

Amendment 1312

13 1 1

holding

that

right to effective counsel was

Subsequently, defendant petitioned the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals for a writ of habeas corpus. 13 14 After granting the writ,
the Second Circuit stated that defendant should be released from
the custody of the state unless he was afforded an opportunity to
present his state constitutional claim to the New York Court of

Appeals. 13 15

The court found that the defendant's right to effective legal

counsel was not violated by using his inculpatory statements for
the basis of the indictment, reasoning that the statements were
made at the preaccusatory stage of the criminal investigation. 1316

Moreover, the court stated that, although defendant's attorney
defendant Angel Claudio. Id. Defendant accompanied the police to the police
station and told them he had been asleep at home at the time of the murder. Id.
Thereafter, defendant retained counsel to represent him in connection with the
shooting. Id. at 558-59, 453 N.E.2d at 501, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
1309. Claudio, 83 N.Y.2d at 78, 629 N.E.2d at 385, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 913,
After defendant and his attorney arrived at the District Attorney's office, a
prosecutor told the attorney that there was insufficient evidence to charge
defendant unless he confessed, and that there would be no plea bargain for
defendant. Claudio I, 59 N.Y.2d at 559, 453 N.E.2d at 501, 466 N.Y.S.2d
272. With his attorney present, defendant was interviewed by the authorities,
and made extensive inculpatory admissions, resulting in his arrest. Id.
1310. Claudio, 83 N.Y.2d at 78, 79, 629 N.E.2d at 384-85, 607 N.Y.S.2d at
913.
1311. Id. at 78, 629 N.E.2d at 385, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
1312. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment states in pertinent
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." Id.
1313. Claudio, 83 N.Y.2d at 78, 629 N.E.2d at 385, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
1314. Id.
1315. Claudio, 83 N.Y.2d at 78, 629 N.E.2d at 385, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 913
(citing Claudio v. Scully, 982 F.2d 798, 806 (2d Cir. 1992)).
1316. Claudio, 83 N.Y.2d at 78, 629 N.E.2d at 385, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
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"the prosecutor and the police

scrupulously honored the defendant's relationship with his
13 17

retained attorney."
In reaching its conclusion, the court relied first on the basic
purposes and constitutional interests inherent in a criminal
defendant's right to counsel under both the New York
Constitution and the Federal Constitution. 13 18 The court stated

that, in our adversary system of criminal justice, these purposes
and interests of defendant's right to counsel are "that partisan
advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate
objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go
free," 13 19 and that an advocate must be sufficiently competent to
320
"insure 'fairness in the adversary criminal process.'"1
Furthermore, the court stated that "[t]he right to the effective
1317. Id. at 79, 629 N.E.2d at 385, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 913. Defendant argued
that once his state right to counsel is in effect, all other constitutional
guarantees associated with it simultaneously spring into effect. Id. In making
this argument, defendant relied on People v. Skinner, 52 N.Y.2d 24, 417
N.E.2d 501, 436 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1980). In Skinner, the court stated that a
defendant, when considering whether to waive his rights at the preaccusatory
stage, has the right to have an attorney present, and that defendant cannot
make an effective waiver of counsel unless it is made in the presence of that
counsel. Id. at 28, 417 N.E.2d at 503, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 209. The defendant
interpreted this statement to mean that once he had the right to counsel, he
automatically had the right to effective assistance of counsel. Claudio, 83
N.Y.2d at 79, 629 N.E.2d at 385, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 913. The court, in the case
at bar, stated that Skinner was inapplicable because the purpose of its holding
was to prevent official overreaching and ensure the defendant will be able to
communicate through counsel if he so chooses. Id. at 81-82, 629 N.E.2d at
387, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 915. Furthermore, Skinner cannot extend the right to
effective assistance of counsel to the preaccusatory stage because that right has
a different purpose which is to preserve our adversarial system of criminal
justice. Id.
1318. Claudio, 83 N.Y.2d at 79-82, 629 N.E.2d at 385-87, 607 N.Y.S.2d at
913-15.
1319. Id. at 79, 629 N.E.2d at 386, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 914 (quoting United
States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655 (1984) (quoting Herring v. New York,
422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975))).
1320. Id. at 80, 629 N.E.2d at 386, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 914 (quoting United
States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981)).
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assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but
because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive

a fair trial." 132 1 These are the same concerns that are embodied
in New York's standard to insure effective assistance of counsel
to the criminal defendant. 1322 The court reasoned that the above
intrinsic premises and purposes of the constitutional right to
effective counsel imply that it is "not triggered until adversarial

judicial criminal proceedings have been instituted against a
defendant .... ",1323

Additionally, in reaching its conclusion, the court relied on
several federal and state court decisions. For example, in Kirby
v. Illinois, 132 4 the United States Supreme Court held that a

person's Sixth Amendment right to counsel "attaches only at or
after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been
initiated against him."' 1325 However, the Supreme Court found
1321. Id. (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 648, 658 (1984)).
Additionally, in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the United
States Supreme Court set out a two-part test to show that defendant's assistance
of counsel was so defective as to warrant reversal. Id. at 685.
[A] fair trial is one in which evidence subject to adversarial testing is
presented to an impartial tribunal for resolution of issues defined in
advance of the proceeding. The right to counsel plays a crucial role in
the adversarial system embodied in the Sixth Amendment, since access
to counsel's skill and knowledge is necessary to accord defendants
'ample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution' to which they
are entitled.
Id. at 685.
1322. Claudio, 83 N.Y.2d at 80, 629 N.E.2d at 386, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
In People v. Baldi, the court stated New York's standard to ensure effective
assistance of counsel to a criminal defendant. "So long as the evidence, the
law, and the circumstances of a particular case, viewed in totality and as of
time of the representation, reveal that the attorney provided meaningful
representation, the constitutional requirement will have been met." Baldi, 54
N.Y.2d 137, 147, 429 N.E.2d 400, 405, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893, 898 (1981).
1323. Claudio, 83 N.Y.2d at 80, 629 N.E.2d at 386, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
1324. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
1325. Id. at 688. Other decisions support this same proposition. See, e.g.,
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (holding that a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attaches at the time of a preliminary hearing);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. (1967) (holding that a post-indictment pretrial
lineup at which the accused is exhibited to identifying witnesses is a critical
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that, although the defendants had no lawyer present when the

victim initialiy identified them, their Sixth Amendment right to
counsel was not violated because it took place before the
326
commencement of any prosecution. 1
Similarly, the state constitutional right to "effective assistance
of counsel does not arise until the commencement of adversarial
judicial proceedings ... ."1327 In People v. Claudio (Claudio

I),1328 the New York Court of Appeals held that this defendant's
right to effective counsel under the Sixth Amendment had not
been violated by taking his confession at the preaccusatory stage
because no criminal proceedings had begun. 1329 Additionally, the
court in Claudio I reasoned that because defendant had no right
to a lawyer when he confessed, he likewise cannot be "rewarded
by a suppression order merely because he chose to bring a lawyer
who proved valueless." 1330 Furthermore, defendant had no right
stage of the criminal prosecution and accused has the Sixth Amendment right
to have counsel present); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (holding that
defendants' Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at the time of their
arraignment because it is a critical period of the criminal proceedings).
1326. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 690. The Court stated:
The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere
formalism. It is the starting point of our whole system of adversary
criminal justice. For it is only then that the government has committed
itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of
government and defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant
finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society,
and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal
law. It is at this point, therefore, that marks the commencement of the
"criminal prosecutions" to which alone explicit guarantees of the Sixth
Amendment are applicable.
Id. at 689-90.
1327. Claudio, 83 N.Y.2d at 80, 629 N.E.2d at 386, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
See People v. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d 218, 221, 400 N.E.2d 1344, 1345-46, 424
N.Y.S.2d 893, 894 (1980). "The defendant is entitled to counsel at all critical
stages of the criminal prosecution." Id. "The right to counsel attaches, of
course, once the criminal action has been commenced." Id. "But it may also
attach at an earlier stage if there has been significant judicial activity." Id.
1328. 59 N.Y.2d 556, 453 N.E.2d 500, 466 N.Y.S.2d 271 (1983).
1329. Id. at 563, 453 N.E.2d at 503, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
1330. Id. at 561, 453 N.E.2d at 502, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 273.
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to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment at
the preaccusatory stage because at that time, "neither law
enforcement officials nor the courts have any reason to be aware
of the ineffectiveness of a person's lawyer, or any obligation to
remedy such ineffectiveness." 13 3 1
Additional support for the court's decision comes from People
v. Beam. 1332 In Beam, this court held that defendant was
afforded all the protections encompassed by the constitutional
right to counsel because when defendant confessed to the police
at the preaccusatory stage of the criminal proceeding, the police
honored his right to counsel and determined that he was speaking
with them on the advice of his lawyer. 1333 The essence of the
holding in Beam, as stated in Claudio, is that "the right to
counsel that had indelibly attached by the entry of a retained
attorney at the preaccusatory stage was simply the right not to
have the attorney-client relationship interfered with or
disregarded by law enforcement authorities," and thus not a
guarantee to effective counsel.1334 Instead, it is a guarantee that
law enforcement agents fully honor defendant's choice to
communicate through an attorney. 13 3 5
Therefore, according to the Claudio court in the instant case,
defendant's state constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel was not violated because his attorney's incompetence
occurred at the preaccusatory stage of the criminal
proceeding. 1336 Moreover, the law enforcement authorities fully
honored his right to counsel when he retained and consulted his
attorney. 13

1331.
1332.
1333.
1334.

37

Id. at 562, 453 N.E.2d at 503, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 273.
57 N.Y.2d 241, 441 N.E.2d 1093, 455 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1982).
Id. at 255, 441 N.E.2d at 1100, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
Claudio, 83 N.Y.2d at 83, 629 N.E.2d at 388, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 916.

1335. Id.; see also Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990) ("[W]e
now hold that when counsel is requested, interrogation must cease and officials
may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present, whether or not the
accused has consulted with his attorney.").
1336. Claudio, 83 N.Y.2d at 83, 629 N.E.2d at 388, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
1337. Id.
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